The law attempts to control movement and space in
a milieu where this is
increasingly difficult to do. The law then finds
itself in conflict in
that a knowing gaze can only be maintained over a
static object. If
meaning is constantly changed or subverted, how
can it be comprehensively
known? The constant movement and flux it is faced
with make it impossible
to encompass all the spaces of the urban. Total
surveillance is doomed to
failure. A disciplinary map cannot be constructed
over an object which
refuses to remain static, "regulation within the
urban becomes a process
of suture over rupture, a body politic in a state
of accelerated
sclerosis" (Stanley 94).
The response of the state is to nominate "wild
zones," fenced off areas
in which the transgressive is able to be
regulated, not directly, but
through being identified as dangerous, as
"other," as a problem area.
These are ambiguous spaces, strategic admissions
of failure by the law,
but at the same time necessary, as the "other" is
always necessary in the
construction of a "self." These are the spaces in
which raves are able to
take place, in which resistance or dissent
becomes possible. At the same
time, they allow the construction of the rave as
disordered "other" to
society's(FN10) ordered and sane self. I will
return later to the
importance of space and movement to rave as a
political practice.
RAVE AND THE SOCIAL ORDERRave culture offers a
powerful critique of
contemporary British society(FN11) which cannot
be viewed as simply
symbolic, as the tradition of the CCCS would lead
us to believe. Ravers
follow on from hippies and punks in their pursuit
of alternative values
and lifestyles, but there are certain glaring
differences between rave
and its predecessors. Rave culture is probably
the largest
youth/sub/counterculture of the postwar era. Only
a small minority of
youth were ever hippies or punks. Estimates in
the U.K. for 1992 suggest
that rave culture, in both legal clubs and
illegal raves, generated door
sales of some 4 billion pounds, outstripping
sports, live arts and movies
combined (Thornton 15).
Revenue prospects such as this might suggest that
rave would be welcomed
into post-Thatcherite Britain as a productive and
booming industry,
embraced by capital and by government for its
income generating
potential. Why then, is rave culture still
marginalized, still demonized?
I believe it is because the critique it offers is
potentially more
dangerous than the money it generates. While
generating profit, its
hedonism denies the side of capitalism that
stresses the deferral of
gratification and, at its best (when raves are
thrown in order to throw a
good party, as opposed to opening a club to make
money), it denies the
basis of exploitation upon which capitalism is
built. It fosters values
and morals counter to the dominant norms in
society and threatening to
those who attempt to define it as "other" (which
I will discuss later).
Yet, in its ambiguity, it defies the easy naming,
knowing, and
colonization that would see it incorporated into
the mainstream of
society in the same way that aspects of hippie
culture have been. As the
culture has grown, so has the potential threat it
poses to "norms" of
society:. As the "moral panic" developed, a
conflict between the idea of
free enterprise and a conservative hierarchical
social structure became
apparent. Law-abiding citizens were positioned in
contrast to fantasies
of an evil cult that congregates at mass
sex-and-drug orgies. At first,
the police were not very interested in a
relatively small number of
people engaging in the intake of illicit
substances such as ecstasy, even
though it was listed as a Class A drug.... It was
only when thousands of
people became involved, attending large social
gatherings...and seen to
be enjoying themselves like the "rich," that the
social order
was "destabilised." (Rietveld 68).
One of the defining characteristics of rave
culture is that it is based
on a sense of community, even of tribalism. This
is reflected in the
names of music collectives and party organizers
such as Spiral Tribe, Dub
Tribe and Groove Collective. This communitarian
underpinning helps to
perpetuate positive feelings toward others. Rave
culture tends toward an
inclusive egalitarianism. Unlike previous youth
cultures, rave is truly a
mass phenomena, not the domain of an elite few.
Conservative estimates
are that "hundreds of thousands" of youths went
raving every week in
Britain in 1994 (Merchant and Macdonald 18).
Rave culture has drawn
heavily on gay culture, and taken from it a
certain camp sensibility, joy
in spectacle, openness, and self expression not
seen in traditional clubs
(Murphie and Scheer 179). This acceptance means
that groups traditionally
marginal in youth cultures, or possibly even
victims of the violence of
some previous cultures (women, homosexuals,
ethnic minorities),
participate in rave culture without the same
threat of violence found in
traditional pubs and clubs. The Rave is not an
essentially masculine
affair and Rave Culture, unlike many other youth
subcultures, is not
dominated by machismo and masculine styles of
behaviour. The more
egalitarian gender relations and the lack of
sexual threat at Raves make
them virtually unique. (Merchant and Macdonald
33). Although the ethnic
mix at raves is more dependent on locality (i.e.,
likely to be more mixed
in the south of England, where the population is
more mixed), there seems
reason to believe that rave culture is more
tolerant in this sense as
well. Displays, or even threats, of violence seem
to be rare, and a
tenuous link has even been made between the
growth of rave culture and
the decline of football hooliganism (34).
The egalitarian image of rave culture is not
universally accepted.
Thornton, in analyzing rave culture, has
emphasized internal hierarchies
based on subculture/mainstream and
in/authenticity dualities. She bases
this analysis on the concept of "subcultural
capital," a notion drawn
from Bordieau to make sense of the distinctions
within youth culture. She
argues that rave is a "taste culture" (3), and
that these similarities in
tastes and discriminatory gate-keeping practices
(which maintain gender
balance and keep minority group numbers down) are
"arguably the
precondition for that oft-celebrated experience
of social harmony, the
thrill of belonging" (24).
Thornton's ethnographic research was carried out
not among
regular "punters," but rather by talking with
DJs, promoters, and club
owners--the inner circle of ravers. Likewise, her
descriptions of gate-
keeping practices seem to apply only to specific
situations--nightclubs
where tickets are paid for at the door, as
opposed to pre-sale tickets
for nightclubs and actual raves. This approach
might tend to skew her
conclusions in the direction of an
elitist/hierarchical picture of
raving. These are the groups of people who have
the most to gain or lose
by such a notion of "subcultural capital," and
are most involved in an
internal hierarchy within rave culture. Her
conversations with regular
clubbers tended to put more stress on the
relationship between rave and
the mainstream. While not disputing the existence
of internal
hierarchies, it is possible that a different
weighting of the research
may have resulted in differing conclusions. Other
studies, such as
Merchant and Macdonald's, have come to different
conclusions stressing
the egalitarian nature of rave culture.
Thornton's idea of a "taste culture" is also
somewhat problematic.
Although ravers are brought together by similar
tastes and desires such
as music or dancing, a wider view of people who
attend raves shows
anything but a homogenous crowd interested only
in electronic music and
drugs. Raves draw people from a wide spectrum of
society, ranging from
New Age travelers to university students, with
"older groups of young
people (in their late twenties and thirties)
participating as vigorously
as teenagers" (Merchant and Macdonald 34). Most
raves play a varity of
music, and today's techno traces its roots to
sources as diverse as acid
jazz, salsa, punk, Manchester guitar pop, disco,
classical music, and the
experimental electronic work of musicians such as
Kraftwerk and Brian
Eno. At any rave the music may vary from mellow
ambient and dub, played
at 30-40 beats per minute, to Rotterdam and
Hardstomp, which can go up to
250 bpm. Thornton's claim that ravers are somehow
homogenous, brought
together by some mass taste, contradicts her own
assertion of difference
within rave culture.
The extent to which rave can be considered an
egalitarian culture is far
from resolved and the amount of actual
ethnographic work done on rave
culture is far too limited in scope to come to
any premature conclusions.
Thornton's research contradicts much of the other
work on rave culture
(Redhead et al., Merchant and Macdonald), but
this does not rule out the
validity of her claims. Rave culture does have
internal hierarchies, but
these hierarchies are themselves qualitatively
different from those of
the dominant culture, as they are based largely
on the extent to which
one participates in the culture, rather than on
gender or skin color. It
may be possible to argue that the hierarchies in
rave culture are also
more benevolent than those they replace, as there
is no evidence within
rave for the kind of violence associated with
other youth cultures, such
as mods, skins, or punks. More research is
required on these
contradictions before any firm conclusions can be
drawn. However, despite
its internal hierarchies, I argue that in rave
culture we are witnessing
a radical alteration or critique of the dominant
social order, and that
in its size there exists a great possibility for
change, as youth
worldwide experience firsthand a more egalitarian
culture. Even Thornton
admits that "youth are rebellious in their
opposition to the mainstream
as a complacent, dominant culture" (166).
If we accept Foucault's analysis of power as
omnipresent,(FN12) then
Thornton is looking in the wrong direction. Rave
cultures functioning
inside of capitalism, and the existence of
internal cultural hierarchies
are not faults that undermine the positive
aspects of the culture. If
power is everywhere, there will always be
hierarchies. The nature of
those hierarchies must be examined, and I propose
the hierarchies in rave
culture are less damaging to those at the bottom
than the hierarchies
found in other subcultures and in the dominant
social order. Power cannot
be done away with, but working within capitalism,
rave uses the
power/knowledge nexus of modernity to subvert
modern forms of control and
regulation (see the final section of this
article). That rave has
hierarchies and incorporates aspects of
capitalism does not necessarily
undermine the value of the critique it offers or
the positive values that
ravers espouse.
Rave's legacy cannot yet be known, as it is a
culture that appears to
still be growing, and about which academic
knowledge is severely limited.
But if the voices of those involved in the
culture are anything to go by,
rave culture poses a serious threat to the social
order and to dominant
morality. One example is: "Rave Culture has
served to democratise youth
culture and to involve large numbers of people
from diverse social
backgrounds" (Merchant and Macdonald 35), but it
has also changed the way
many of these people think, as. many thousands
of "ordinary" and working
class young people have, probably for the first
time, experimented with
powerful, illicit drugs. Given the popularity of
Ecstasy (and other drugs
like cannabis), it is unlikely that young people
will forget the positive
experiences they have had and return solely to
the consumption of
alcohol. (Merchant and MacDonald 35).
This is not, however, a consensual view of rave
culture. Those who,
despite rejecting the CCCS's class-based view of
youth cultures, still
share the CCCS's view of what real political
resistance entails, see rave
falling short of making a meaningful difference.
For these theorists "a
(politica) critique was never posed. Rather, a
threat to the symbolic
order was made by the attempt to avoid it
altogether. No meaning could be
found other than pure escape" (Rietveld 43). For
Rietveld, attempting to
analyze rave through the work of Baudrillard,
rave culture offers a
symbolic threat, but in the end this is not
enough because, finally, it
has no meaning. A political critique is never
made, because rave simply
avoids the symbolic order altogether, and as such
the practice has no
meaning except escape. Rietveld's point here
depends very much on a
particular definition of politics, and seems
somewhat confused, as she
also states that this escape is necessary to
avoid a knowing or
colonizing gaze--the only way to ensure some kind
of freedom--and that
this could "possess a greater threat than simply
to pose a subcultural
style within the context of a so-called dominant
culture" (65). Rietveld
fails to fully acknowledge the political
potential that lies in this
refusal, the real subversion that can come as a
result of a symbolic
threat.
Rietveld was writing in 1992, before the Criminal
Justice Act was passed.
However, post-CJA writing that continues to draw
on the work of the CCCS
has continued this criticism of rave culture.
Thornton argues that ravers
define and "know" the mainstream in the same way
that it attempts
to "know" them, and that ravers purposefully
create themselves as
an "underground," fighting the power of the
mainstream. For her, the
negative aspects of the hierarchical nature of
rave culture are clouded
by the fondness that youth subcultures have for
appropriating political
rhetorics and frequently referring to "rights,"
"freedoms," "equality,"
and "unity." This can be seen as a strategy by
which political issues are
enlisted in order to give youthful leisure
activities that extra punch,
that je ne sais quoi, a sense of independence,
even danger. (Thornton
167).
For these theorists, rave culture has not
subverted dominant cultural
patterns, but rather offers alternative patterns.
As such, rave culture
has established its own kind of morality, most
notably around drug
culture and a refusal to see the law as the
arbiter of what is wrong. For
ravers, the law is an arbitrary rule that has
criminalized, with somewhat
fuzzy logic, what they do for fun (Stanley 105).
Thornton's claims about the intentions of ravers
and their use of
political rhetoric smakcs of one of Marx's more
dangerous theories of
culture, that of false consciousness. This was
the same kind of thinking
that surfaced in the works of Adorno to dismiss
pop music as the cultural
equivalent of the factory in enslaving the minds
of the people, and to
instate classical music as the cultural product
of an intellectual
avantgarde (Adorno 1-70). The problem with this
kind of theory is that it
assumes the stupidity of the majority of the
population and seeks to
claim a privileged role for the academic as the
bearer of truth and
knowledge. Thornton's claim that rave is
apolitical (in her sense of the
word) lies in direct opposition to the fact that
20,000 "scroungers,
anarchists and shaven-headed trouble makers"
(Platt 15) turned up outside
Downing Street to protest the CJB; that action
groups such as Liberty and
Charter 88 have attracted large numbers of ravers
(Foley 48); and that
many ravers attempt to follow a lifestyle which
values the freedom of
others. Theories of false consciousness come to.
a sad conclusion, which
does little justice to the feeling of elation
that a rave event can give
to its participants. Neither does it explain the
"moral panic" of
the "righteous citizen," whose view on the world
is shaped by
representations that reconfirm the solidity, the
inalterability, of the
dominant, or established, symbolic order.
(Rietveld 58).
The effects of Thornton's argument here is to
disempower rave culture,
its knowledge, and claims, and to return the
academic to a privileged
position of knowledge and power, as arbiters of
truth. It is also to deny
the power of hundreds of thousands of people in
the U.K. (Merchant and
Macdonald 18) going out every weekend to pursue
an activity which the
government has tried, for eight years, to
destroy.
Thornton's work falls into a body of Marxist
cultural theory which has
attempted to reinscribe the power of Marxism
within cultural studies. A
central argument of these theorists is that
postmodern theory has been
too quick to see difference as a good thing in
itself. However, diversity
is the new control mechanism of modern
capitalism. In the late twentieth
century, capital has realized that an attempt to
control through unity or
conformity will fail because "attempts to
establish a common ground of
control inevitably open a common ground for
opposition" (Tetzlaff 19).
Resistance will occur no matter what, and it can
be best controlled
through a fragmentation of the grounds for
resistance and the direction
of opposition into areas where they cannot do
much harm (19).
There are problems with this line of logic. It
criticizes popular
cultures for their lack of unity, and their lack
of real political
action, but does not provide any new basis for
politics. Tetzlaff and
Thornton both hark back to a Marxist ideal that
everyone is going to
unite on some common ground to fight capitalism,
but they provide no real
basis on which this kind of ground can be built.
Tetzlaff defines "a
cultural practice as oppositional if it resists a
primary form of power
in effect at a site where it occurs. Since these
sites differ, opposition
would always be context dependent" (22). This
definition subverts his own
notion of unity, by making a statement to the
effect that the form and
purpose of opposition are always dependent on
context.
Thornton makes a similar argument about rave
culture. Her complaint about
earlier theory, including some of the CCCS work,
was that. difference
was cast positively as deviance and dissidence.
If one believes that it
is the nature of power to homogenise...then
difference can be seen as a
good thing in itself. But if one considers the
function of difference
within an ever more finely graded social
structure, its political
tendencies become more ambiguous.... Each
cultural difference is a
potential distinction, a suggestion of
superiority, an assertion of
hierarchy, a possible alibi for subordination. In
many circumstances,
then, the politics of difference is more
appropriately cast as
discrimination and distinction. (Thornton 166).
Although there is a valuable point made here
concerning the possible
dangers of difference, there is every bit as much
danger in condemning
difference out of hand as there is in accepting
every difference with
open arms. Thornton also ignores the side of rave
culture which "celebrat
es the pleasure of difference, rather than its
violence" (Murphie and
Sheer 179).
What should be examined is the nature of the
difference we are talking
about. One of the most vaunted aspects of rave
culture is the feeling of
unity or oneness found at raves. For youth in
Britain, rave culture
is "the start of a reaction against post-punk
fragmentation, with common
experiences (1980s Tory unemployment) and
objectives (raving) uniting
youth once again" (Russell 117). Rave is a
celebration of the differences
between people--that it is neat that I am
straight, you are gay, I am
black, you are white--and that there is a common
practice, raving, which
can bring these people together, and in which
they can articulate their
dissent from a dominant culture which does not
cater to their beliefs
about life. Again, Thornton never quite makes it
clear what it is about
the differences in rave culture that are good or
bad, or what kind or
sameness she thinks could be better.
In the end, there is nothing that can guarantee
control, by either the
state or capital, through fragmentation unless
one buys into a notion of
false consciousness and a belief that humans are
easily fooled. The
creation of numerous small groups, the
splintering of identity, and the
growth of difference may seem plausible
mechanisms of control until one
realizes the possibilities that such splintering
has to backfire, and the
potential such groups have to take on a life of
their own?one which may
potentially threaten large-scale institutions of
social control.
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